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This collection brings together some of Gary Francione’s
best known and most controversial essays stretching back over
the past two decades. The gist of Francione’s position is that
we need to advance beyond the defenses of animals that were
set out by Peter Singer and Tom Regan more than 30 years
ago. However, Francione gives us a peculiar mix of the novel
and the traditional. Unlike Singer and Regan, he is traditional
in his unhesitating committing to sentientism, to the view that
“Sentience is necessary to have interests at all” (p.11). This is
controversial given that it drives apart the moral concern associated with animal liberation and the kinds of concern associated with eco-activism in the interests of the non-sentient (e.g.,
eco-systems, trees and so on). But Francione is comparatively
untraditional is rejecting the view that a defense of animals requires us to show that their ways of thinking are closely akin to
our ways of thinking. (A theme pursued in the essay on “Taking
Sentience Seriously.”)
Francione is again traditional when he accepts Singer and
Regan’s views about which ethical norms matter, i.e. rights and
consequences. He rejects any attempted broadening of ethical
norms that seeks to include but in some sense go beyond animal
rights. (A theme pursued in the review essay “Ecofeminism
and Animal Rights.”) And he endorses the Singer and Regan
position that, when a serious choice must be made, we may
have non-prejudicial grounds for favoring humans over nonhumans. He also appeals, just as Singer and Regan do, to the
argument from marginal cases. (This is a feature of Francione’s
writing that is sometimes overlooked but it can be found on
pages 12 and 64 of the present volume.) His essays are not in
these respects an attempt to move things on towards a revised
ethical standpoint.
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What Francione provides instead is a distinctive political or
politico-legal response to the plight of animals. It might even
be unfair to Francione to evaluate his writings as if he were
carrying out some other task, or more especially the same task
as Singer and Regan but without a similar depth of argumentation. Because of this, I will suggest that we have some reason
to allow Francione extra leeway when his distinctions or background arguments don’t quite hold together in an ideal manner. Politics requires, and effective political strategy sometimes
necessitates, an informed rhetoric that favors big ideas and
striking contrasts which do not always look so clear-cut upon a
closer analytic interrogation. Painting with broad brushstrokes
works well as a provisional, rough-and-ready call for individuals to take a political stand and at times it is simply not intended
as a final and detailed picture.
A challenge to the legal standing of animals as property is
the cornerstone of Francione’s position. He claims that the recognition of the intrinsic value of animals is not just in tension
with, but is absolutely incompatible with, viewing and treating
animals in this way. Any serious commitment to animal liberation must therefore require a commitment to end their classification as property. The big distinction that dovetails with
this focus is a contrast between those who do not believe that
animals should be property (“liberationists”) and those who accept their property standing or who couple a commitment to
animal liberation with a further belief that it may be assisted by
incremental changes in animal welfare. If you hold to the latter
approach then you are, in Francione’s terms, a “new welfarist”
and not a “liberationist” (p.2). This contrast, familiar in animal
rights circles, is normative as well as descriptive. It presupposes that we ought to be “liberationists.” It is also a hard and fast
binary pairing of a sort that may make us uneasy. It supports
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the claim that those in the two different camps belong, in some
sense to two different movements, a view that has been seen as
divisive, or divisive in the wrong way: it takes the small minority who are committed to animal liberation and turns them into
an even smaller minority.
I do not think that Francione is presuming (implausibly) that
most vegetarians or vegans actually happen to hold any explicit
position on such matters. Most have probably never heard of
Francione or his “new welfarist” versus “liberationist” contrast.
(And it is still not a part of the material covered in many undergraduate courses on applied ethics that deal with the standing
of animals. It should be, but it isn’t.) What I will suggest is that,
from Francione’s point of view, the millions of vegetarians and
vegans who hold no particular position about ultimate goals,
or about how they might be attained, are in fact, by default,
“welfarists” or “new welfarists” and so fall on the wrong side
of the binary contrast. But this may make them precisely the individuals that Francione wants, in the first instance, to address
and to win over.
As a familiar critical point about Francione’s contrast, it is
set up in an unsettling way because it also represents some individuals with a clear and perhaps dedicated commitment to animal liberation as “new welfarists” rather than “liberationists.”
Even so, the political strategy within which the distinction
plays a role is the rejection of time-wasting welfare measures
as measures that do not further a recognition of the intrinsic
value of animals. When it comes to recognizing intrinsic value,
Francione holds that few things actually make a difference:
propagandizing is one, and the extension of veganism is another, but ultimately the ending of the property status of animals
is what matters.
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Here, we might wonder about whether matters have to be so
clear cut. However, with various empirical examples to back
up his case, Francione argues that the law always favors human interests over non-human interests. While animal welfare
changes do occur they do so always in the interests of humans
(often the economic interests of humans) rather than in the interests of animals. And so there simply is no legal recognition
of significant animal interests and nothing that would count as
moving closer to such recognition while still regarding animals
as property.
It is at points like this that I wonder about how tidy a separation we can make between Francione as a political strategist
and Francione as someone who is trying to set up a plausible
ethical argument of a far more general sort. What worries me,
in particular, is that this does look like an attempted ethical
exploration of the concept of property, and the beginnings of
an exploration of the concept of intrinsic value, rather than an
empirical generalization about people who view animals as instances of the former tending not to view them as having any
of the latter. And this conceptual analysis does seem to form
part of an argument. What confuses me a little, when I reflect
upon what Francione is trying to do is that this is not a particularly good argument. Francione’s claims do not come close
to supporting his rather strong conclusion. And this makes me
wonder about whether I have fully understood what he is up to.
(Perhaps I have missed something important, something that
would make everything fall into place.) Pointing out that the
law always puts human interests first (even if correct) gives us
reasons to say that the law endorses a greater value thesis (that
humans are always and everywhere more valuable and more
important than animals). But it is not nearly enough to support
Francione’s claim that the law endorses a sole value thesis (that
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only humans have intrinsic value). And so the evidence that he
gives, about how law invariably functions, is not strictly relevant to the conclusion.
But here, perhaps, I am again falling into precisely the trap
that I have set out to avoid, perhaps I am making the mistake of
writing about Francione as if he was trying to do what Singer
and Regan do (but managing it less effectively, less proficiently). However, this concern too may be a little unfair. It may be
unfair to Francione’s scholarship to ignore the fact that there really is much more here than political strategy, even if the direct
underpinning of a strategy happens to be his dominant concern.
There is certainly an argument of a sort, one which is shaped by
legal norms of argumentation (norms which draw from Francione’s legal background) and these are in many ways different
from the analytic philosophical norms of argumentation that
shape the way of writing in Singer and, even more so, Regan.
Again, perhaps it is my understanding of the position, and what
is taken for granted, that is flawed.
At the very least, Francione does try to do something to
bridge the gap between what is actually shown and the strong
conclusion that he want us to support, the conclusion that viewing animals as property and viewing animals as intrinsically
valuable cannot ever go together. To bridge the gap he appeals
to an analogy between animal ownership and slavery in the ante-bellum South. And here, again, the appeal is of a fairly broad
sort that is well-adapted to political debate but which glides
over the significantly different positions of different sorts of
slaves such as field-hands compared to house-slaves. Again,
fairly or unfairly, I am tempted to look beyond political strategy
and to point out that, to be at all plausible, the strong claim that
slavery excludes the recognition of a lessened and diminished
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but nonetheless real intrinsic value would have to depend upon
more than a single streamlined American case. Slavery covers
a lot of territory and a lot of institutions and it is far from obvious, once we cast our eyes a bit further and wider, that the recognition of property standing and of significant intrinsic value
have always been incompatible. Ancient Roman slavery would,
for example, have to be considered as an obvious problem case
(perhaps more so than slavery in the ante-Bellum South) given
the steady transition of household slaves into client freedmen
in the Roman urbs and given the fact that in antiquity, at some
times and in some places, slaves had sanctuary rights in temples
while still remaining slaves, hence someone else’s property.
This looks suspiciously like support for the view that being
property may be deplorable but it does not necessarily eclipse
being seen as intrinsically valuable to an extent. In more contemporary times, the fact that companion animals are legally
classified as property, and are at least formally regarded as such
by the courts (if not by their “owners”) again does not seem
to have prevented some recent divorce cases in the US from
involving custody disputes about “pets,” in which rival parties
have been called upon to make legally-significant claims about
what is in the best interests of the animals concerned.
My point here is that Francione acknowledges, but does not
do justice to the fact that while property may not be a legal fiction (as property skeptics suggest) it is also not absolute and
that it is standardly qualified in various ways including (and
this is something Francione absolutely and explicitly rejects)
recognition, in the case of animals, that the property in question is of such a nature that it has interests that the law ought
to be responsive to. That is to say, it does no good to assert that
property can’t have interests as if it were a conceptual truth.
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This being the case, it is extremely difficult to sustain the
view that no welfare changes can ever be linked to the promotion of a greater legal (or wider) recognition of the intrinsic
value of animals. I have, I confess, in the course of looking over
this collection of essays, entirely given up reading Francione as
an effective defender of this thesis. Perhaps it can be defended in some significantly different way, but I have reservations
about even this. (I do not know what a convincing defense of
the thesis would look like.) Nonetheless, what Francione does
marvelously well, is to direct the reader’s attention to the genuine dangers of regarding animals as property and to the need
for a strategy to move things forward beyond this degrading
subordination. In some way that I cannot quite fathom he also
does this better than almost any other author that I know. This
is not, of course, praise of a sort that Francione will want, but
neither is it faint or damning.
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